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Satire er i stigende grad med til at forme vores politiske bevidsthed. Men hvad 
sker der, når politiske emner bliver formuleret igennem satire? Formålet med 
denne artikel er at undersøge en af de mest udbredte udtryksformer inden for 
politisk satire, nemlig parodi, med henblik på at afdække parodiens bidrag til 
satire, samt at foretage en vurdering af parodiens kritiske potentiale. Jeg 
argumenterer for, at parodi kan forstås som en form for dekonstruktion, og at 
dens kritiske potentiale ligger i dens evne til at destabilisere politiske 





Satire is to an increasing extent a part of the formation of our political 
consciousness. But what happens when political matters are expressed through 
satire? The purpose of this article is to investigate a satirical mode of expression, 
namely parody, in order to determine the contribution that parody lends to 
satire as well as making an assessment of the critical potential of parody itself. 
I argue that parody can be understood as an instance of Derridean 
deconstruction and that its critical potential lies in its ability to destabilize 
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Satire is becoming increasingly influential in shaping political debates today. 
To a growing number of people, satirical news presents a much-desired 
supplement to mainstream news and some people have even started to replace 
traditional media with satirical news as their primary source of information. 
This is not only an American or Western phenomenon but something that is 
happening all over the world (Baym and Jones 2013). Therefore, it is necessary 
to take satire seriously as a political force that is shaping our political 
discourses. Unfortunately, satire as a phenomenon is hard to pin down, as it 
makes use of numerous different modes of expression, such as irony, sarcasm, 
hyperbole, profanity, and many more. That is why I have chosen instead to 
focus my inquiry on one specific form of satire, namely satirical parody. Parody 
is a widely used medium for satirical critique and has been used since the dawn 
of satire. Furthermore, I believe that parody is exemplary in showing how satire 
can work as critique.  
But how exactly does parody work? What are the philosophical assumptions 
about language and society that parody relies on? And does parody have the 
potential to express in-depth critique and create real political change? To 
answer these questions, I will explore an interpretation of parody as a form of 
Derridean deconstruction which plays on the fundamental structure of 
language. I will support this hypothesis by analyzing the use of parody in 
Jonathan Swift’s satirical essay A Modest Proposal (1729). Finally, I will consider 
the political and critical power of parodic deconstruction with the help of the 
theories of Chantal Mouffe and Catherine Zuckert. But before taking on these 
questions, the very notion of parody will first have to be clearly defined.  
 
Defining parody 
Many of the most influential satirists of all time have made use of parody. This 
goes for classical satirists such as Jonathan Swift, Jane Austen and Oscar Wilde 
as well as modern satirists like Stephen Colbert and Sasha Baron Cohen. 
Parodies of political leaders, campaign ads and entire ideologies are some of 
      /  Anne-Sophie Sørup Nielsen    ISSN: 2245-9855 
 
 
Tidsskrift for Medier, Erkendelse og Formidling Årg. 7, nr. 2 (2019) 
Journal of Media, Cognition and Communication Vol. 7, no. 2 (2019) 
30
the most widespread and well-known instances of satire; from Aristophanes’ 
parody of Socrates in The Clouds to Tina Fey’s spot- on impression of the former 
Alaskan governor, Sarah Palin on the show Saturday Night Live. Parodies have 
even been used by several philosophers as a rhetorical and an argumentative 
instrument. Most noticeable is perhaps the figure of Zarathustra in Nietzsche’s 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883), who shares several noticeable characteristics with 
the figure of Jesus Christ and derives a lot of its critical force from this 
resemblance.  
It is widely debated whether parody should be understood as a genre in its 
own right or as a technique that can be used in the service of for instance satire.1 
I believe that there are some obvious problems in regarding parody as an 
independent genre. First of all, parodies can be applied to various genres and 
are often used to caricature a certain genre as a way to mock and critique it. 
This is the case in Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey (1817), which is a parody of 
the gothic novel as a literary genre. Another example of this is the song 
“Country Song (Pandering)” by contemporary comedian Bo Burnham from the 
stand-up show Make Happy (2016), where he plays with the musical genre 
called ‘stadium country’. Both these parodies make fun of their ‘host-genre’, 
but at the same time they repeat and reproduce it. To say that Northanger Abbey 
is a gothic novel would be both right and wrong, since it is undeniably more 
than that, adding a level of self-reflection to the otherwise rather naïve genre, 
but at the same time it is the most typical of all gothic novels because it plays on 
the stereotypes that characterize the genre. If parody were a separate genre, it 
would be a genre that could contain and take the form of all other genres. This 
seems to me to be a confused usage of the notion of genre. Since parody can 
take on any genre, I find it more useful to think of it as a highly versatile artistic 
technique, device or instrument. 
What, then, are the main characteristics of this technique? Or in other words: 
How does one turn something original into a parody? I have chosen to take the 
theory of Margaret A. Rose, presented in the book Parody//Meta-Fiction (1979), 
as the starting point of my inquiry. She defines parody as “the critical quotation 
                                                 
1 For “genre” see Hutcheon, L. A. Theory of Parody. New York & London: Methuen, 1985. For 
“technique” see M.A. Rose: 1979 or Householder Jr., F.W. “Parodia”, in Classical Philology 39, 
no. 1. The University of Chicago Press, 1944. 
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of preformed literary language with comic effect” (59). In this definition, we 
find several characteristics: critique, quotation, literary language and comic 
effect. I agree with all of these features except the notion that parody is purely 
literary. Parody can occur in many different media and is found in all forms of 
expression from cartoons to philosophy (Householder 1944, 3-4). The ‘targets’ 
of political parody also take on various forms, ranging from political speeches, 
interviews and campaign ads to the discourse of certain political parties or the 
rhetorical style of specific news anchors. So parody is not necessarily literary 
and does not always revolve around texts or pieces of art. But it is critical, and 
it does work by repeating or ‘quoting’ the original, resulting in a humorous 
detachment from it. But how exactly does it work?  
According to Rose, there are several ways in which a text can be parodied: 
“[P]arody works by way of juxtaposition, omission, addition condensation, and 
by discontinuance of the semantic and metaphoric logic of the original context 
which it quotes or alludes to in order to refunction it” (45). Under a common 
term, I will refer to all of these methods as forms of distortion. In the parody, the 
subject being imitated is distorted but never so much that the connection to the 
original source is broken. In the article Parody as Criticism (1964), William van 
O’Connor writes that parody presents the original as “exaggerated, [and] 
distorted – yet not in essence misrepresented” (242). Distortion is a necessary 
condition of parody, as is maintaining the connection with the original and 
staying true to its ideas.  
However, as Rose remarks, although the ideas might have been clear in the 
original, the parody often adds a layer of ambiguity. It borrows the words and 
ideas of the original only to repeat them in such a fashion that they either ring 
hollow or suddenly seem suspicious (Rose, 47). This distortion and criticism of 
the original is also what creates the comic effect. Rose bases this claim on Kant’s 
theory of humor: “So for Kant, for example, the essence of humor lay in raising 
the expectation for X and giving Y. This simple dictum has been accepted by 
most analysts of comedy and is particularly well suited to describing the 
mechanism at work in parody” (23). Incongruity or discrepancy is a central part 
of parody, since the original is always transformed, but the link between 
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original and parody is preserved. The comic effect of parody lies, then, in the 
“discrepancy between the parodied text and its new context” (Rose, 23).2  
It is now possible to establish a list of characteristics of the parodic technique, 
some of which are necessary and some of which are contingent: 1) a parody 
bears a clear similarity and dependence on the original, 2) parody is repetition 
with comical and critical distance, 3) it is a distorted repetition, and 4) it is often 
ambiguous, which makes it difficult to extract a direct point or expression of 
opinion from it. In short, parody is an artistic device used to produce a comedic 
critique of its original by repeating or reproducing the central point(s) of the 
original but this time with an ironic detachment or a comedic distance. An 
example of a parodic figure which bears all of these characteristics can be found 
in Stephen Colbert’s character from the Colbert Report who is, confusingly, also 
named Stephen Colbert. Colbert’s character is inspired by conservative news 
anchor Bill O’Reilly but is a general parody of right-wing political pundits. The 
similarities between Colbert and O’Reilly are clear, both in the opinions that 
they hold as well as in their ways of expressing themselves. But it is not an exact 
match. Colbert exaggerates and distorts the kind of reasoning that O’Reilly uses 
to the point where it ceases to make sense and becomes ridiculous, thus 
providing the comical and critical distance. Still, Colbert does not directly 
refute O’Reilly’s argument, nor does he present an alternative political position, 
which makes it difficult to derive a definite political opinion from it, leaving 
the performance somewhat ambiguous. 
 
The contribution of parody to political satire: Parody as deconstruction 
Having dealt with parody as an artistic device, I will go on to investigate the 
philosophical method that I believe to be at work in parody, namely the method 
of deconstruction as championed by Jacques Derrida.  
                                                 
2 The notion that parody is inherently comic has been disputed by Linda Hutcheon. Hutcheon 
wants to use the term ‘parody’ to describe works that are not meant to ridicule or critique 
but rather to pay homage to other works by repeating certain phrases and styles. I believe 
these works to be better classified as imitations or instances of intertextuality and have 
therefore chosen to preserve the notion that a comedic effect is fundamental to parody. 
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When satirists Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert have been asked to describe 
their specific brand of political satire, they have referred to it as a 
“deconstruction of news and politics” (McClennen and Maisel 2014, 98-99). A 
big part of this deconstructivist approach is seen in the way they imitate and 
parody the “real" news in The Daily Show and The Colbert Report as well as how 
they sometimes parody the politicians themselves. This is perhaps best 
exemplified in the two times that Stephen Colbert (in character) ran for 
president of the United States (in 2008 and 2012). In the following, I will be 
exploring the kinship between parody and deconstruction with the hope of 
illuminating the philosophical method at work in parody and its critical and 
political potential. 
One thing that sets parody apart from other instruments of political satire is the 
intimate connection that parody has to its object of critique. Parody presents a 
critique that is extracted directly from the target. It is almost as though the 
target criticizes itself when its logical fallacies and argumentative incongruities 
are revealed by means of imitation. This kind of “repetition with critical 
distance”, I find, is reminiscent of the method of deconstruction (Hutcheon 
1985, 18). In a noteworthy article, Robert Phiddian, author of a celebrated book 
about the parody of Jonathan Swift, goes so far as to argue that parody and 
deconstruction are secretly the same thing (1997, 681). Parody and 
deconstruction are both critiques from the ”inside” of a text. It is a critique that 
“nests in the structure of the text and ideas it criticizes, as a cuckoo infiltrates 
and takes over the nests of other birds” (Phiddian, 681). In a similar fashion, 
deconstruction takes on the logic and the ideas of a text in order to drive them 
to their extremes, ultimately showing their instability and internal 
contradictions. This technique is described in a passage that Phiddian quotes 
from Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1997): 
 
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy [sollicitent] 
structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor 
can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. 
Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and 
all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily 
from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources 
of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, 
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that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and 
atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way 
falls prey to its own work. (24) 
 
Here, Derrida states the method of deconstruction with some clarity. 
Deconstruction is a mode of critique or subversion that works from within the 
text by inhabiting the structures or logic of the text. Derrida states that we are 
always living within the confines of a certain logic, especially in the cases where 
we take this logic for granted and it goes unquestioned. Deconstruction 
questions the text by developing the logic in the text further – especially in the 
cases where this logic is least explicit. The specific manner in which 
deconstruction inhabits the structure of a text is by assimilating into the text 
and, at the same time, staying estranged from it. Like deconstruction, parody 
is parasitic, living off the energy and internal logic of other texts.3 Phiddian 
writes: “Parody is the parasite genre that can attach to any other (…), living off 
its mimetic, expressive or rhetoric energy, and reminding it and us that we are 
facing words rather than things, rhetoric rather than pure ideas, language 
rather than phenomena” (689). Here, we start to see a glimpse of the critical 
aspect of deconstruction and parody. Using only the text itself, it recreates the 
central points of the text but now adding a veil of doubt. Phiddian calls 
deconstruction a “hermeneutic of suspicion” (676), a very fitting expression. 
Parody and deconstruction both introduce a suspicion towards the original that 
undermines its authority – the claim that this exact text manages to truthfully 
represent the world as it really is. In plain terms, deconstruction (and parody) 
sets everything in quotation marks. It makes the reader skeptical of any text’s 
claim to truth. This was for example the case with Jonathan Swift’s famous 
book Gulliver’s Travels (1726). As Phiddian writes: “After Gulliver’s Travels we 
will never entirely trust a travel book again” (689). The parodic deconstruction 
of the travel book that Swift uses in Gulliver’s Travels shines a different light on 
the entire genre. So did Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1980), which can 
be read as a parody of a detective story. The notion of a detective story “looks 
different after The Name of the Rose, and that difference looks very like a play of 
                                                 
3 I use the word “text” in the broadest possible sense of the word, including speeches, 
broadcasting, body language, etc. 
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différance” (Phiddian, 681). Phiddian, here, introduces a central term from the 
deconstructivist tradition, namely différance. But what does différance mean? 
And what does différance have to do with parody? 
 
Parody as a play on différance 
In a lecture that was later published as an essay titled “Différance” (1986), 
Jacques Derrida presents and discusses the theory of différance at length. 
Derrida puts a great deal of effort into explaining that différance is neither a 
concept nor even a word and how, therefore, it is basically impossible to define 
the term (3). He goes on to state that différance cannot be said to ”be” as such -  
it does not ”exist” nor is it really ”absent”. It does not exist because it has no 
presence like other existent things. And it is not absent because absence points 
negatively to a possible presence. Generally, Derrida is more concerned with 
telling the audience what différance is not than what this mysterious term 
actually means. In order for me to be able to philosophically investigate the 
meaning of différance, I will have to set aside Derrida’s statement that différance 
is not a concept and attempt to define it anyway.  
The aim of the term is to bring together two meanings of the Latin verb 
”differer” which have been lost in the French ”différence”, namely the meaning 
”to defer” and ”to differ” (Derrida 1986, 7-8). These two meanings point to two 
distinct kinds of difference: 1) The first refers to a deferral or delay of meaning. 
The idea here is that all signs are ”late”. They are stand-ins for something which 
was once present. Take for instance a note saying “remember to buy coffee”. 
This note is a sign (to yourself or someone else) that signals an intention or 
thought that was at one time present but which is now being communicated 
with a delay. To Derrida all signs and all language work like this:  
 
The sign, in this sense, is a deferred presence. Whether we are 
concerned with the verbal or the written sign, with the monetary 
sign, or with electoral delegation and political representation, the 
circulation of signs defers the moment in which we can encounter 
the thing itself, make it ours, consume or expend it, touch it, see it, 
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intuit its presence. (1986, 9)  
 
Here, différance hints at the delayed meaning of words that never accomplishes 
to truly designate the thing ”as it is” when it is present to the beholder. Derrida 
uses this semiotic thought to put the existence of an ”original” presence into 
question. Seeing that such a presence is, and always would be, unfathomable 
through language it is uncertain why it should carry the weight in 
philosophical discourse that it traditionally has done. Immediacy and presence 
in an ontological sense have traditionally taken primacy over mediated and 
communicated ideas of being. This is the essential theory behind Derrida’s 
critique of the primacy of speech over writing in Of Grammatology.  
2) Now to the second meaning of the Latin ”differer” which is to ”differ”. This 
meaning is to some extent still there in the word difference. This side of 
”differer” refers to the role that difference plays in providing meaning to 
words. Derrida states that words only become meaningful through their 
relation to and difference from other words: “[I]n language there are only 
differences. (…) [E]very concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within 
which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play 
of differences” (1986, 10-11). The easiest example to consider here is that of a 
dictionary. In a dictionary, no word has a meaning on its own. Each word is 
defined by other words that are defined by still more words which, although 
they define one another, are fundamentally different from each other. It is the 
fact that they differ which, according to Derrida, is the foundation of their 
meaning: the word ”cat” has a meaning in that it is not the same as ”dog”. These 
are the two meanings of ”differer” that Derrida seeks to resuscitate with the 
word différance.  
So, Derrida wants to remind his readers that there are more ways in which 
things can be different from each other and that this differentiation is what 
language consists of. But what is différance? It is not a concept, not at word, not 
a method, so what is it? Derrida is suspicious of the very way this question is 
posed. The ”what” indicates a search for an essence, a substance, a presence 
which he insists that différance does not possess (1986, 14-15). In “Différance”, 
the closest Derrida comes to determining the ”what” of the term is by referring 
to différance as a ”force” or a ”movement” (18). In a later interview, he states 
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that: “Différance is the ”productive” movement of differences” (1988, 85). It is 
that which produces difference but also the general force of differentiation. It 
is the reason or, better, the fact that words change their meaning over time and 
in different contexts. It is the instability inherent in meaning and language. One 
might ask: What is, then, the connection between différance and deconstruction? 
It is difficult to find any texts that explain the exact connection between these 
two ”concepts”, but I would venture the interpretation that différance should be 
seen as simply a kind of fact about language and the world. It is not a method 
or an approach to language. It is simply how language works, according to 
Derrida. Deconstruction, on the other hand, is the method of tracing or 
enhancing the play of différance in language to make it apparent and push 
forward the movement of différance. Deconstruction might be seen as the 
”active” part of différance which in itself is neither active nor passive (Derrida 
1986, 9). 
Now, what does all of this have to do with parody? When Phiddian argues that 
parody is like différance, he makes some considerable adjustments to the term. 
He does not buy into Derrida’s idea that différance is a common trait to all 
language. He argues that “we have to read past the Derridean proposition that 
différance is a transcendental principle implicit in all language (…) to read it in 
a tactical sense as a description of a certain kind of language” (685). For 
Phiddian, it is something specifically characteristic of parody. Deconstruction, 
too, is something which, he argues, happens most explicitly in parody. He does 
this because he wants to be able to separate parody from what can be called 
”straight language”. ”Straight language” is the kind of language that attempts 
to represent a reality as it is and unambiguously convey the author’s opinion; 
it is plain language without irony, sarcasm or parodic distance (Phiddian, 680). 
Phiddian’s aim is to argue for the special capabilities of the parodic form, which 
is why this form has to be separable from normal or ”straight language”. The 
problem is, of course, that this is a misreading of Derrida’s philosophy which 
attempts to contrive a theory of all forms of language and not just of parody. 
Like Phiddian, I am attempting to argue that parody possesses a quality that 
”straight language” does not and that this quality makes it a suitable 
instrument for political and moral critique. And, likewise, I believe this quality 
to be best understood in Derrida’s terms of deconstruction and différance. 
However, I do not think that it is necessary to misread Derrida to make this 
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argument. So how does one go about solving the problem that Derrida clearly 
aims at providing a universal theory of language, but that this theory seems to 
be best applicable when it comes to just one instance of language, namely 
parody? 
One way of dealing with this problem would be to regard all language as a 
kind of parody. And this would indeed be possible. One would then have to 
claim that all sentences are, in some sense, quotations of prior sentences in a 
new context, although the result is not always humorous nor critical. But this 
approach undermines the argument that parody, as opposed to ”straight 
language”, has a special ability to criticize or question ideas because it would 
mean that no language could be considered as being ”straight”. Another 
possible response is, like Phiddian, to claim that the theories of deconstruction 
and différance are not universal but only explain what is at work in this specific 
form of expression: in parody. However, as mentioned above, this ignores 
Derrida’s original point. Moreover, it results in a rather naïve notion of 
”straight language” because if only parody is seen as a form of différance, this 
means that all non-parodic language should work without any deferral and 
difference. It should be straight and stable in a way that not only Derrida, but 
every dialectical thinker since Hegel would perceive as impossible. This is why 
I prefer a third option which is to assert that all language is, in fact, a play of 
différance but that parodies reveal this fact in a way that ”straight language” 
does not. ”Straight language” can even be seen as the attempt to hide the play 
of différance and insist on a consistency and stability that is not actually there. I 
find this third solution most gratifying because it preserves the notion that 
language is always in motion and that meaning is contextual. It also makes it 
possible to establish a distinction between what, in everyday life, is experienced 
and understood as ”straight language” and what is clearly acknowledged as 
being something else, namely parody. In addition, this solution accomplishes 
the aim of identifying what is particular to parody and why parody is a suitable 
medium for critique. Revealing, by way of imitation and exaggeration, the 
mechanism of deconstruction of concepts and ideas already at work in every 
statement makes the process conscious and gives the audience a chance to be 
skeptical in a way that is not encouraged in regular, ”straight” speech and text. 
So, parody, seen as an instrument, can be understood as the method of 
exaggerating and revealing the différance that was already there in the original 
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but in a way that makes the recipient aware of it and makes her question her 
immediate impression. In this sense, parody is not just a criticism of this or that 
specific discourse or logic. Parody proclaims the impossibility of any text, 
however straight it attempts to be. It shows that language is deeply unstable 
and that concepts (such as right, wrong, progress or wealth) are always 
debatable.  
 
An (im)modest proposal 
A great example of satirical parody which deconstructs a logic from within and, 
ultimately, questions the very meaning of morality can be found in Jonathan 
Swift’s A Modest Proposal. The text was written as an imitation of a political 
pamphlet, in which Swift parodies the empirical, calculating and avaricious 
attitude of contemporary politicians. The proposal that he presents is that, as a 
solution to the growing problem of poverty and the increase in especially child 
beggars, the wealthy elite should begin to eat the children of the lower classes. 
To argue his point, he proceeds with calculations concerning the number of 
child beggars, their approximate weight and nutritional value, the cost of 
breeding and nurturing them until they reach the appropriate size and even 
provides one or two recipes for cooking the children (149-50). As the text 
progresses, it seems there is nothing that this proposal will not fix. Swift even 
argues that this practice of selling babies for consumption will cause a decrease 
in domestic violence, as the men will be more careful with their wives during 
pregnancy, since they are now carrying something of actual value. He writes:  
 
Men would become as fond of their Wives, during the Time of their 
Pregnancy, as they are now of their Mares in Foal, their Cows in Calf, 
or Sows when they are ready to Farrow; nor offer to Beat or Kick them 
(as is too frequent a practice) for fear of a Miscarriage. (155)  
 
Swift uses the calculating logic of contemporary politicians and exaggerates it 
to a point where the complete lack of moral concern becomes unbearable. The 
parody, in this case, takes on a form very similar to an argument ad absurdum. 
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The most interesting part is that he makes a great and convincing argument if 
one ignores the obvious moral oversight. The logic is flawless which is, of 
course, the point. Swift pushes the instrumental rationality to a point where no 
one in their right mind would perceive it as rational anymore. This is what 
satirical parody can do by revealing the problematic contradictions inherent in 
terms like ”the greater good”, ”growth” and ”value”. When Swift talks of the 
value of these children, he refers to their monetary value as a product to be sold 
and bought. This notion stands in direct contrast to the idea that most people 
might have of an inherent value of human life. Showing how these two 
understandings of value are always at play simultaneously when we use the 
word is a way of revealing the force of différance in language through 
deconstruction. Now I will go on to consider in more detail the political and 
critical potential of this satirical technique. 
 
The political and critical potential of deconstruction 
At the heart of deconstruction lies a certain prioritization of two classical, 
philosophical dichotomies, namely the primacy of contingency over necessity 
and possibility over actuality. Deconstruction is always aimed at undermining 
the perceived necessity of our supposed truths, revealing how they are, in fact, 
contingent and a product of historical and cultural circumstances. This insight 
allows the deconstructivist to suggest the possibility of a different 
interpretation of the world – to focus on what might be possible instead of 
simply what is. This is one of the reasons why the deconstruction presented in 
parodic satire is politically interesting. But the question of the political impact 
of deconstruction is not so easily answered. Derrida’s deconstruction is both 
political and anti-political, depending on what one expects from a political 
theory. It is political because it is radically anti-totalitarian and emancipatory. 
It is anti-political in that it makes the construction of any new value system, 
ideology or anthropology virtually impossible or, at least, inherently 
suspicious. I will now look at the political potential of deconstruction, after 
which I will go on to consider the objections raised against reading Derrida as 
a political philosopher. 
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Derrida himself is of the opinion that deconstructivism does have a political 
significance. In a lecture on the relationship between deconstruction and 
pragmatism, Derrida touches on the subject of the political and what he thinks 
deconstruction can contribute in terms of politics and political change. Here, he 
introduces the notion of the political as a way to stabilize the violent chaos of 
the world by forcing rules and conventions onto it. He says: 
 
[O]nce it is granted that violence is in fact irreducible, it becomes 
necessary – and this is the moment of politics – to have rules, 
conventions and stabilizations of power. All that a deconstructive 
point of view tries to show is that since convention, institution and 
consensus are stabilizations (sometimes stabilizations of great 
duration, sometimes micro-stabilizations), this means that they are 
stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. (1996, 83) 
 
Derrida understands ”the political” as the fight against a fundamental 
instability; as an attempt to create stability in the midst of chaos and conflict. 
Deconstruction, then, is a reminder that the structures and power stabilizations 
are man-made and, therefore, contingent. This realization paves the way for 
new possible ways of organizing society. Even though the chaos is terrifying, it 
carries within it a potential for emancipation from restrictive power structures. 
Derrida goes on to say: “Now, this chaos and instability, which is fundamental, 
founding and irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we 
struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but 
at the same time it is a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize” (1996, 84). 
Although ”the political” is an artificial stabilization, it is also a political act to 
destabilize it, to emancipate oneself from it and bring about change. Derrida 
states that there is “no ethico-political decision or gesture without (…) a ‘Yes’ 
to emancipation” (1996, 82). So it seems that both stabilization and 
destabilization are forms of the political in a Derridean sense, but 
deconstruction only offers a way to destabilize political structures, not a way to 
build them back up. Deconstruction is not about forming a unity or a political 
consensus but about undermining unity and making any hegemonic 
homogeneity appear suspicious. This focus on conflict and pluralism instead of 
consensus is the reason why the political philosopher Chantal Mouffe states 
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that deconstruction is “primarily a political logic” (1996, 2). She writes: “By 
showing the structural undecidability of numerous areas of the social, 
deconstruction reveals the contingency of the social, widening in that way the 
field of political institution” (1996, 2). Mouffe’s theories of radical democracy 
and agonistic pluralism, like the theories of Derrida, emphasize the importance 
and inevitability of disruption and conflict. The idea is that politics are roused 
and fuelled by conflict and that there will always be conflicts in a society. Every 
advantage will prove a disadvantage to the ”other”; every decision will be a 
“detriment of another nation (…), another family (…) of other friends” (Derrida 
1996, 86). That is why politics and political philosophy should not, according 
to Mouffe, strive to avoid or ignore conflict by searching for universal 
principles that will eventually turn out to be culturally and historically 
conditioned. Instead, they should be concerned with the ideological fight over 
the power to control the discourse, knowing that this discourse can never be 
universally true or just. 
With this approach, Mouffe sets herself apart from many other political 
philosophers who adhere to a more Hegelian and rationalistic conception of 
politics as an ongoing progression towards a political utopia of unity without 
difference. Mouffe opposes this line of thought, stating: “What is specific of 
democratic politics is not the overcoming of the we/them opposition but the 
different ways in which it is drawn” (1996, 8). To her, agonism or the 
embracement of conflict is the essence of the political as opposed to consensus. 
The dream of consensus, Mouffe says, is a fantasy and a dangerous one at that 
because failing to see conflict does not mean that conflict does not exist, it only 
means that it is being suppressed or that some people’s suffering is being 
accepted as a necessity for stability. According to her, deconstruction “reveals 
the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion” (9). And 
because of this recognition of the inescapability of conflict, Mouffe considers 
the deconstructivist approach superior over all other theoretical approaches 
that aim at consensus (11). 
The belief that any form of consensus is artificial and only created by absorbing 
and suppressing difference is what, to Catherine Zuckert, makes Derrida 
fundamentally anti-activist, anti-revolutionary and, subsequently, politically 
impotent (1991, 354-55). In the text “The Politics of Derridean Deconstruction” 
(1991), Zuckert is searching for a foundation or a mere possibility of creating a 
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positive political ideal within the scope of Derrida’s thinking. But Derrida shies 
away from any such system-building, arguing that any system will eventually 
turn into a totalitarian ideology or simply collapse. This, according to Zuckert, 
makes Derrida politically passive and inapplicable. This passivity is what she 
perceives to be the real Heideggerian heritage in his writings: “The trace [of 
Heidegger] is (…) to be found in the essential passivity of an historical-poetic 
attempt to oppose the totalitarian effects of the ideological, technocratic politics 
of the will to power with receptive openness” (355). Just as the late Heidegger 
urged his readers to open themselves up to a possible ontological event 
(Ereignis), Derrida encourages his readers to listen and react to the autonomous 
movements of différance – without knowing where they will go or how to 
influence them. This becomes the only way to avoid constructing new 
totalitarian systems. The problem is that this aimlessness is politically 
paralyzing and the refusal to construct positive ideals is dangerous, as it 
becomes impossible to judge whether a political development is good or bad. 
Without positive values and ideas, one cannot rationally argue that democracy 
should be better than dictatorship or that equality is better than inequality. This 
leads to an inconsistency in Derrida’s thinking. For if no position can be 
deemed better than another, then why should ”openness” or emancipation, 
which Derrida clearly values, be any different? Zuckert ends up concluding 
that Derrida’s “radical uncertainty has a debilitating effect on political action” 
(356). According to her, Derrida’s inability to provide a positive political theory 
or the foundation for a stable world view makes him politically irrelevant or 
even reactionary.  
So which interpretation is more convincing? I believe that, to some extent, both 
Mouffe and Zuckert are right. They present two different notions of politics: a 
negative and a positive. The negative (Mouffe) primarily focuses on the 
disruption of established norms and social structures, whereas the positive 
(Zuckert) insists on the need for new ideals in order to create new structures 
and institutions that might bring about a more just society. Ultimately, both 
elements are necessary in order to bring about political change. First, the 
existent system must be challenged and destabilized, undermining the matter-
of-factness of the given world order. Only then can we go on to rebuild with 
the insights that deconstructive analysis has offered. Consequently, the answer 
to the question “can parody change the word?” is no, but it can be the instigator 
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of such a change. Deconstructive parody is only political in a negative way 
which means that is does perform an important critique of that which is being 
parodied; however, this criticism alone is not enough to actually solve the 
problem and transform society.  
In conclusion, parody as a form of political satire is a suitable device for 
negative critique due to its method of deconstruction and its ability to reveal 
the play of différance in moral and political rhetoric. Parody works by repeating 
and mirroring real-life political ideas and discourses but with a critical distance. 
This distance provides the recipient with a suspicious look at propositions that 
are presented in a ”straight language”. The political potential of parody, like 
that of deconstruction, lies in its ability to question this supposedly ”straight 
language” and the moral and political ”stabilizations” that it entails. When a 
satirist parodies a political text or a specific politician, this works as a critical 
deconstruction of the original context and all the deep-rooted assumptions that 
belong to this context. By exaggerating and distorting the original, the parody 
puts that which is taken for granted into question and allows the recipient to 
break with the given structure. In itself, parody may not be transformative, but 
it does possess a disruptive, subversive force that is clearly critical and, I would 
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